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Fiat justitia, mat coelum: 
Is the International Court 
of Justice aware of this?
by D Shanmuganathan
The author takes a critical look at the ICJ's advisory opinion in a 
case involving defamation suits filed by Malaysian lawyers against 
a Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights in Malaysia
A collision between the Malaysian Courts and the United 
L\ Nations has been averted by the International Court of 
A. AJustice (hereafter ICJ) through its Advisory Opinion, 
on the question of diplomatic immunity for Mr Dato Param 
Cumaraswamy (hereafter Mr Cumaraswamy), a Special 
Rapporteur to the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights in Malaysia (see Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal 
Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights 
(1999) 38 International Legal Material 873). A controversial 
interview given by the Special Rapporteur alleged that some of 
the lawyers and litigants in Malaysia adopted the technique of 
'judge choosing' for favourable judgments. This allegation 
sparked a row between certain firms and the Special 
Rapporteur, and this led to the filing of defamation suits 
against him. The Special Rapporteur claimed diplomatic 
immunity with the aid of a certificate issued by the United 
Nations Secretary General. The Malaysian courts declined to 
accept the stand taken by the Special Rapporteur and 
preceded with the suits (see Data' Param Cumaraswamy v MBf 
Capital Bhd and another (1997) 3 Malayan Law Journal 824). 
The United Nations Secretary General requested the ICJ, 
through the Economic and Social Council (hereaftero v
ECOSOC), for an Advisory Opinion on die disputed issue of 
diplomatic immunity. On 29 April 1999 the ICJ, by a 14:1 
majority, declared that the Special Rapporteur was entitled to 
immunity following its earlier Opinion in the Dr Mazilu case 
(see Advisory Opinion on the Applicability of Article VI, section 22 of 
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 
(1990)29ILM98).
The following discussion will show why the Malaysian 
courts refused to acknowledge the Special Rapporteur's 
claim to immunity and how the ICJ's Opinion rescued the 
United Nations from paying compensation to the 
Malaysian firms. Further, this discussion will establish the 
failure and misconception of the facts by the majority 
Opinion, which led to the miscarriage of justice akin to 
David losing to Goliath.
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY AND THE 
DOMESTIC COURTS OF MALAYSIA
Mission and mandate
Mr Cumaraswamy, a leading Malaysian advocate, was 
appointed by the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights as the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of 
the Judiciary in Malaysia for a period of three years. The 
mandate entrusted to him was three fold:
(1) To inquire into any substantial allegations transmitted to 
him or her and report his or her conclusions thereon;
(2) To identify and record not only attacks on the 
independence of the judiciary, lawyers and court 
officials but also progress achieved in protecting and 
enhancing their independence, and make concrete 
recommendations including the provision of advisory 
services or technical assistance when they are 
requested by the State concerned;
(3) To study, for the purpose of making proposals, 
important and topical questions of principle with a 
view to protecting and enhancing the independence 
of the judiciary and lawyers (see (1994) 20
Commonwealth Law Bulletin 957).
Controversial interview and the defamation litigation
Mr Samuels for the International Commercial Litigation 
Journal interviewed Mr Cumaraswamy (Malaysian Justice on 
Trial) and during the interview, Mr Cumaraswamy alleged 
that the lawyers and litigants in Malaysia had adopted a 
practice of 'judge choosing' in order to obtain favourable 
judgments. He pointed out a particular case and said:
'This case looks like a very obvious, perhaps even glaring, 
example of judge choosing.. .the "judge choosing" allegations in 
the Ayer Molek affair, people first started to question the integrity 
of the judiciary after the US $4m (RM 10m) libel award Vincent 
Tan received on 22 October last year'. (Samuels, D, 'Malaysian
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Justice on Trial' (1995) International Commercial Litigation, 
p. 10)
The firms to which Mr Cumaraswamy referred in his 
interview issued legal notice stating that the International 
Commercial Litigation interview had gravely and seriously 
injured their trading reputation and brought them into 
public scandal, odium and contempt. Responding to the 
legal notice, Mr Cumaraswamy claimed that, being the 
UN Special Rapporteur, he was protected by diplomatic 
immunity. To that effect, the Centre for Human Rights of 
the UN Office at Geneva informed the firms' solicitors 
that the Special Rapporteur had immunity from legal 
process under Article VI, section 22 of the Convention on 
the Privileges and Immunities of the UN 1946 (hereafter 
the 1946 Convention).
'Section 22- Experts (other than officials coming within the 
scope of article V) performing missions jor the United Nations shall 
be accorded such privileges and immunities as are necessaryjbr the 
independent exercise of their Junctions during the period oj their 
missions, including the time spent on journeys in connection with 
their missions. In particularly they shall be accorded: in respect of 
words spoken or written and acts done by them in the course of 
performance of their mission, immunity from legal process of every 
kind. This immunity from legal process shall continue to be 
accorded notwithstanding that the persons concerned are no longer 
employed as missions Jor the United Nations'.
Mr Cumaraswamy also claimed immunity by virtue of 
his mandate as well as Article 12 of the Diplomatic 
Privileges (UN & ICJ) Order 1949:
'Except in so Jar as in any particular case any privilege or 
immunity waived the Secretary of the United Nations shall enjoy:
(b) immunity Jrom legal process of every kind in respect of 
words spoken or written and all acts done by them in the exercise 
of these Junctions'.
The reply by Mr Cumaraswamy and the UN Human 
Rights Commission did not provide satisfaction to the 
firms, who eventually filed suits for defamation and 
claimed a sum of RMISm (RM6 = approximately £1) for 
damages and exemplary costs. Mr Cumaraswamy filed an 
application to dismiss the suit in limine on the ground of 
diplomatic immunity provided to him by virtue of Article 
VI of the 1946 Convention.
High Court and Court of Appeal's decisions
The Judicial Commissioner (JC), who initially dealt with 
this case, discussed the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in the 
Dr Mazilu case, on the applicability of Article VI, section 
22 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the UN. However, the JC held that, on a point of public 
international law, the ICJ Advisory Opinion was not 
binding in the national courts and that the issue of 
absolute immunity could only be decided by trial. Hence, 
the JC dismissed Mr Cumaraswamy's application with 
costs (see (1997) 3 Malayan Law Journal 300).
Against the order of the JC, Mr Cumaraswamy appealed 
to the Court of Appeal, questioning the postponement of 
a decision in the immunity issue. The Court of Appeal 
identified the following issue in its discussion to answer 
the appeal by Mr Cumaraswamy.
Whether the competence to make decision lies with the 
courts or with the UN
The Court of Appeal discussed this issue at length, 
alleging that the UN Secretary General interfered with the 
function of the judiciary in the Member State. The Court 
of Appeal distinguished the wording of section 22 of 
Article VI of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities 
of the UN, Article 12(b) of the Diplomatic Privileges (UN 
& ICJ) Order 1949 with the UN Secretary General's 
certificate to the Malaysian government stating that the 
Special Rapporteur had immunity from legal process. The 
UN Secretary General's certificate states:
'To Whom It May Concern
In connection with civil suit No S3023-68-1996 by Mbf 
Capital Bhd and Mbf Northern Securities Sdn Bhd against Data' 
Param Cumaraswamy, the Secretary General of the United 
Nations hereby notifies the competent authorities of Malaysia that 
Data' Param Cumaraswamy, national of Malaysia, is the Special 
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers of the 
United Nations Commission on Human faghts. In this capacity, 
Dato' Param Cumaraswamy is entitled to the privileges and 
immunities accorded to experts performing missions for the United 
Nations under arts VI and VII of the Convention on the Privileges 
and Immunities of the United Nations to which Malaysia has 
been a party since 26 October 1957 without any reservation.
In accordance with s 22 of art VI ojthe Convention, 
"experts.. .performing missions for the United Nations shall be 
accorded such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the 
independent exercise of their functions...." Section 22 (b) of the 
Convention further provides that, "they shall be accorded, in 
respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them in the 
course of performance of their mission, immunity from legal 
process of every kind. " As such, the Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers is immune from legal 
process of every kind in respect of words spoken or written and 
acts done by him in the course of performance of his mission.
The Secretary General determined that the words, 
which constitute the basis of the plaintiff's complaint, in 
this case were spoken by the Special Rapporteur in the 
course of his mission, [emphasis added] The Secretary 
General therefore maintains that Dato' Param Cumaraswamy is 
immune from legal process with respect thereto. Under s 34 of the 
Convention, the Government of Malaysia has a legal obligation to 
"be in a position under its own to give effect to the terms of this 
Convention. " The Secretary General of the United Nations 
therefore requests the competent authorities to extend to Dato' 
Param Cumaraswamy the privileges and immunities, courtesies 
and facilities to which he is entitled under the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations', (see (1997) 3 
Malayan Law Journal 824 at p. 840-1) 21
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The Court of Appeal criticised the above certificate as 
mere ipse dixit, and declared that:
'... the Secretary General may by the stroke of his pen exclude 
the powers of the High Court to make factual determination 
upon which the defendant's immunity is postulated is, with 
respect, an invitation to journey from the sublime to the 
ridiculous, which we must with respect, decline to accept'. 
(see (1997) 3 Malayan Law Journal 824 at p. 843)
The Court of Appeal noted the deletion of the word 
performance in the UN Secretary General's certificate and 
decided that the certificate was neither in accordance 
with section 22 (b) of Article VI of the Convention 
['.. .in respect of words spoken or written and acts done by them 
in the course of performance ojtheir mission, immunity from 
legal process of every kind'] nor did it resemble the wordings 
of the 1949 Order '.. .in respect of words spoken or written 
and all acts done by them in the exercise of these Junctions'. The 
certificate provides a wider meaning than the 1946 
Convention and the UN & ICJ Order. The Court of 
Appeal rejected Mr Cumaraswamy's appeal on citing the 
mandate entrusted to him and held:
'The scope of the defendant's function is to inquire and report 
to the Commission on Human Rights upon matters that concern 
the independence of judges and lawyers. Nowhere by its terms 
does the mandate authorize interviews to members of the press'. 
(see (1997) 3 Malayan Law Journal 824 at p. 849)
The Court of Appeal directed Mr Cumaraswamy to stand 
trial before the Judicial Commissioner.
ADVISORY OPINION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The decision of the Malaysian national courts, discussed 
above, on the issue of diplomatic immunity for the Special 
Rapporteur eventually reached the ICJ through the UN 
Secretary General's request. The ICJ failed to address the 
request of the UN Secretary General or the pleadings of 
the Malaysian Government. However, by an evasive 
Advisory Opinion, the ICJ saved the United Nations from 
paying damages to the Malaysian plaintiffs, as can be seen 
in the following discussion.
Pleadings
The Secretary General initially requested the ICJ through 
the ECOSOC to determine his power to decide:
' /. Whether he has exclusive authority to determine that the words 
were spoken in the course of the performance of a mission?
2. On the basis of his determination, whether the Malaysian 
Government was bound by its legal obligation to inform its 
national courts, and iffailing to do so, to assume the 
responsibility for costs, expenses and damages, if any?' 
(see (1999) 38 ILM 873 at p. 883)
The language employed in the Secretary General's 
certificate issued to die Malaysian Government varies
from his request to the ICJ. Later the ECOSOC modified 
the UN Secretary General's request as:
' 1. To determine the applicability of Article VI, section 22 of the 
Convention of Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations in the case ofDato' Param Cumaraswamy as Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers
2. A request to stay all proceedings relating to this matter in 
Malaysian national courts through its Government'. 
(see (1999) 38 ILM 873 at p. 875)
This modification totally contradicts the initial request 
of the UN Secretary General. According to Judge Koroma 
(ICJ), although the ECOSOC was entitled to change or 
alter the request, it did so without any explanation being 
offered. The Malaysian Government in its written 
statement, citing section 22 of the Convention on the
' o
Privileges and Immunities of the UN, questioned the legal
O ' L O
authority of the UN Secretary General to determine that 
the words were spoken in the course of the performance 
of a mission. It was further contended by the Malaysian 
Government that the modification of the request by 
ECOSOC was not valid on the grounds that the ECOSOC 
was only an instrument to convey the request of the UN 
Secretary General to the Court and therefore it could not 
alter the request. In spite of this, on citing the Dr Mazilu 
case the ICJ, in a majority Opinion of 14:1, held that the 
Special Rapporteur was entitled to immunity.
David lost to Goliath
The ICJ failed to consider the UN Secretary General's 
certificate and whetiier he had issued the certificate in 
accordance with his powers and the law. Paragraph 52 of 
the ICJ's Opinion said:
'In the present case, the Secretary-General, or the Legal 
Counsel for the UN on his behalf, has on numerous occasions 
informed the Government of Malaysia of his finding that Mr 
Cumaraswamy had spoken the words quoted in the article in 
International Commercial Litigation in his capacity as Special 
Rapporteur of the Commission and that he consequently was 
entitled to immunity from "every kind' of legal process". 
(see (1999) 38 ILM 873 at p. 891-2)
This was despite the fact that the Court of Appeal in 
Malaysia had found that the UN Secretary General's 
certificate provides a wider meaning than the text of 
section 22 (b) of Article VI of the 1949 Convention and 
Article 12 (b) of UN & ICJ Order 1949. Moreover, the ICJ 
accepted the certificate of the UN Secretary General, 
which is not in accordance with law. The ICJ failed to note 
that the certificate issued by the UN Secretary General to 
the Malaysian Government was in contrast with his request 
to the ICJ through the ECOSOC. The UN Secretary 
General stated in his certificate that the words were spoken 
by the Special Rapporteur in the course of his mission. 
However, the UN Secretary General requested the ICJ
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through the ECOSOC, to determine that the words wereo '
spoken in the course of the performance of a mission. The 
judges of the majority Opinion failed to note the 
clandestine approach of the UN Secretary General, who 
has not come to the Court of Justice with clean hands. 
Examining the ICJ's approach to this issue, it is evident that 
it did not function as a judicial organ, but merely as an 
executive of the UN to save the payment of compensation 
to the Malaysian firms/plaintiffs.
The Special Rapporteur's interview to International 
Commercial Litigation, according to the ICJ, was well within 
his mandate and it underlined two distinct factors to 
vindicate its stand, namely;
'1. In the pleadings and arguments, the UN contended that it 
is 'usual practice'Jbr the Special Rapporteur to have contact 
with the media.
2. In a letter dated 2-10-98, the High Commissioner oj the 
Human Rights Commissioner stated:
".. .it is more common than not Jbr Special Rapporteurs to 
speak to the press about matters pertaining to their 
investigations, thereby keeping the general public informed of 
their work.", (see (1999) 38 ILM 873 at p. 892)
It is suggested that these factors are neither in accordance
oo
with law nor authorised in the mandate entrusted to the 
Special Rapporteur. Even worse is the ICJ's reliance on a 
letter written by the High Commissioner of the Human 
Rights Commission, who was neither a party to the Opinion, 
nor has the power to declare that the Special Rapporteur was 
immune from any legal proceedings. Nevertheless, the High 
Commissioner declared that it is common for Special 
Rapporteurs to have contact with the media. Even assuming 
that Special Rapporteurs do sometimes contact the media 
to raise public awareness regarding their mandates, Mr 
Cumarasawmy's interview not only mentioned his work, but 
also alleged named individuals had committed illegal acts and 
according to the Malaysian Court of Appeal this was 
something which had to be beyond his mandate.
Moreover, the ICJ assumed that, although litigation was 
pending against Mr Cumaraswamy, the fact that he was 
given an extension for another three years, in 1997, clearly 
showed that he had acted within his mandate, otherwise 
his term would not have been extended. This assumption 
could also be interpreted as though the UN, by extending 
Mr Cumaraswamy's term, were protecting him within the 
ambit of immunity to save the payment of compensation 
to the Malaysians firms/plaintiffs.
Moreover, the ICJ directed that national courts should 
give the UN Secretary General's certificate the greatest 
weight and that it could only be set aside for the most 
compelling of reasons. If this is the position should it be 
treated as genuine, even if the certificate was misleading 
the court? One would come to a conclusion that the UN 
Secretary General had been given a free hand by the ICJ
to issue certificates as he/she likes which should be treated 
as bonafide by the domestic courts.
Even though the ICJ declared that Mr Cumaraswamy 
was immune from any legal proceedings, the best 
compelling reasons known to the ICJ was to make the 
following advice to the UN agents:
o o
'.. .all agents of the United Nations, in whatever official 
capacity they act, must take care not to exceed the scope of their 
Junctions, and should so comport themselves to avoid claims against 
the United Nations', (see (1999) 38 ILM 873 at p. 894]
The ICJ failed to note that the facts and circumstances 
in Dr Mazilu's case, in which he was prevented from 
submitting reports and attending conferences by the 
Romanian Government; on the other hand the Malaysian 
Government had done nothing to Mr Cumaraswamy. 
Therefore it could not be relied on as a precedent.
Due to the above untenable, ill-equipped reasoning and 
the biased umpiring of the ICJ, David lost to Goliath. It is 
a shame that Goliath's foul game was vindicated by some 
of the Member States; the UK, the US and Italy to name 
but a few. These Member States voluntarily abetted in a 
'broad day light judicial murder'.
CONCLUSION
Although both parties agreed on the ICJ's jurisdiction to 
give an Advisory Opinion in relation to the dispute, the 
Court nevertheless devoted the major part of its Opinion 
to the jurisdiction issue. Moreover, the ICJ's advice to UN 
agents, to avoid claims in future against the UN, exposes 
the weakness of its Opinion. Instead of advising the UN 
agents, the ICJ should have directed the UN Secretary 
General to issue certificates in accordance with law.
It is suggested that in reaching this Opinion, the ICJ 
departed from being an independent body of the UN and 
acted as a mouthpiece of the UN. Though, as the ICJ's 
Opinion is final, no justice has been rendered, and what 
remains is miscarriage of justice. Eet us remind the judges 
of the ICJ with Lord Atkin's statement:
'Finality is a good thing, but justice is a better', (see (1933) 
50 Times Law Reports 1 at p. 2)
Judge Koroma said that he, due to his legal conscience, 
disagreed with the majority, so could we therefore 
presume that the judges who were party to the majority 
have no conviction of their legal conscience? If the answer
o
is in the affirmative, David will always lose to Goliath and 
the celebrated legal maximJiat justitia mat coelum will be a 
dead letter in the ICJ. ©
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